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Creativity and Contemporary Value 
 
Abstract: There are few English nouns that have generated such relentlessly good 
publicity as the word ‘creativity’. It is increasingly found scattered across the 
literature of the arts and sciences, industry, business management, information 
technology, education and government. It has been called the key to economic growth, 
the ‘decisive source of competitive advantage’, and the ‘very heart’ of ‘wealth creation 
and social renewal’.1 It is also a burgeoning object of study in the humanities, where 
it is increasingly applied across spheres and disciplines, extending far beyond the 
artist’s studio into the new interdisciplinary schools of Creative Industries, as well as 
into the mainstream of the traditional humanities in the rhetoric of the ‘New 
Humanities’.2 
 
This paper is part of a larger project that investigates the cultural construction of 
creativity in the context of the history of ideas. It understands creativity not as a 
given human attribute or ability, but as an idea that emerges out of specific historical 
moments, shaped by the discourses of politics, science, commerce, and nation. It shifts 
the ground of analysis away from the naturalised models that have traditionally 
dominated the field of creative practice research, in order to highlight the historicity of 
a concept that is more commonly deemed to be without history.  
 
In a recent, if slightly antipathetic, exchange following a presentation of my 
research in progress, I was informed by an anonymous interlocutor that it 
was superfluous to tackle the concept of creativity in any kind of detail, 
because ‘people who are used to dealing with creativity on a daily basis’ have 
no need of such analysis. I wasn’t particularly offended by my exclusion from 
this rarefied circle of ‘people who are used to dealing with creativity on a 
                                                 
1
 The references are to John Howkins, The Creative Economy: How People Make 
Money from Ideas, Penguin, London, 2001, p.vii; Richard Florida, The Rise of the 
Creative Class, Basic Books, New York, 2002, p.5; and John Hartley, Creative 
Industries, Oxford Blackwell, Malden, Mass., 2005, p.4. 
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daily basis’ ----- much of my teaching load is currently taken up with designing 
a core undergraduate writing subject which is largely designed to tackle the 
problem of literacy, and creativity often seems a distant chimera. In any case, 
I presumed my interlocutor’s intended meaning was that ‘people who are 
used to dealing with creativity on a daily basis’ have no need of such an 
analytical perspective because their understanding of creativity works via an 
intuitive logic of ‘I recognise it when I see it’. From this traditional or 
commonsense perspective, creativity is understood to be a word that denotes 
something different and valuable ----- something that is original rather than 
imitative. A creative person is understood to be somebody who is a rule 
breaker, not a follower ----- somebody who manages to embody something in 
words, light or colour that did not previously exist. In this view, a creative 
object is understood to be something valuable (and, in this sense, almost 
useful), but creativity is said not to be a consciously controlled or even 
purposive activity. Creativity is said to be something that does not produce a 
preordained result. Despite this, creative objects are said to possess both 
coherence and lucidity ----- and this is understood to be a necessary rather than 
a fortuitous aspect of a creative work. Though doctors and critics have 
regularly diagnosed famous writers and artists with psychological disorders, 
traditional critics, like my interlocutor, are still apt to draw a distinction 
between creativity and, for example, the art of the insane.  
 
I rather suspect that while people like my interlocutor claim that they 
approach creativity intuitively ----- that is, by a logic of ‘I recognise it when I 
see it’ ----- more often what really occurs is that such people recognise 
creativity by what it is not. Creativity, for example, is typically styled as 
something that is antithetical to scholarship ----- it is not ‘academic’, for 
example, which in this context implies contempt ----- and the subjection of 
creative method to formal academic scrutiny is therefore seen to constitute the 
actions of a villain or a fool. Even the standard definition in the Oxford English 
Dictionary supports the logic of this approach, defining ‘creativity’ as 
something that is ‘differentiated from the merely critical, academic, 
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journalistic, professional, mechanical, etc.’ In this sense, the concept of 
creativity appears to function as an organizing absence rather than an active 
presence in the discourse it sustains ----- and this possibly accounts for its 
capacity to encompass so many paradoxical interpretations. This paper 
attempts to denaturalize the discourse of creativity -- to understand the 
multiple and contradictory ways in which the idea of creativity is deployed in 
the present by tracing its genealogy ----- its lines of descent ----- through the 
past. 
 
Myths of Origin 
One of the most suggestive properties of the word creativity is the late date of 
its emergence ----- making its first appearance as an abstract English noun in 
1875, before entering into common usage a half century later.3 Though 
Raymond Williams has argued that the antecedents of the discourse are to be 
discerned in European culture since the Renaissance ----- for example, Williams 
cites Shakespeare as one of the first English writers to apply the word creation 
to human imagination, this was, to quote Macbeth, in the largely negative 
sense of ‘A Dagger of the Mind, a false Creation, Proceeding from the heat-
oppressed Brain’.4 The concept of imagination as productive and positive that 
is entangled in the modern meaning of the word is difficult to sustain in any 
popular sense before the nineteenth century ----- and imagination as a passive, 
inferior, or as Samuel Johnson put it, ‘vagrant faculty,’ was very much the 
hegemonic discourse until the arrival of romantic discourse in the closing 
decades of the eighteenth century.5  
 
This paper argues that the discourse of creativity is more recent and complex 
                                                 
3
 Paul Oskar Kristeller, ‘Creativity and Tradition’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 44, 
1, 1983, pp.105-113. 
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than Williams’ hugely influential argument allows. It claims that the concept 
of creativity is largely the product of a mid-nineteenth century materialist 
discourse (much of which remains unexamined), rather than a product of 
renaissance, enlightenment, romanticism, or even, as Williams’ text seems to 
imply, a re imagining of classical texts in the fifteenth century with a lengthy 
trail of influences leading back to ancient Greece.6 Moreover, I argue that 
there is a strong sense in which Williams’ text needs to be read historically, as 
a product of the rapid expansion of the discourse of creativity through the 
decades of the 1950s and 1960s ----- as a work that seeks to celebrate the arrival 
of a concept that ‘we should be glad of,’ as Williams puts it, rather than to cast 
a critical eye over its uses and origins.7 Creativity, in Williams’ account, is 
something that is understood to pre-exist both the naming and, indeed, the 
thinking or understanding of the concept. Hence, his historical narrative is 
completely teleological ----- one in which certain exemplary writers come 
successively ‘very near to’ recognizing creativity for what it really is,8 and 
‘what it really is’ is then defined by neuroscientific theories of mental activity 
that were current at the time of publication in the 1960s, and are now 
superceded.  
 
The paper also seeks to highlight the ways in which recent studies 
undertaken in the context of the creative industries phenomenon have largely 
followed Williams in continuing to portray the cultural historical narrative as 
one of progress or increasing perfection ----- as a grand narrative in which the 
cultural blindness of artists and critics of the past inevitably gives way to the 
greater sophistication and recognition of artists in the present. For example, in 
a recent work, Creativity Communication and Cultural Value, Keith Negus and 
Nigel Pickering take Williams’ argument a little further, claiming that cultural 
blindness is coupled with resistance, and it is this resistance on the part of the 
dominant order that accounts for the absence of an overt discourse of 
                                                 
6
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7
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8
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creativity in the four thousand odd years of history that they canvas, because, 
they argue, it is only in the late nineteenth century that ‘creativity could be 
explicitly named as such’.9  
 
Rob Pope’s Creativity: Theory, History, Practice provides another interesting 
example, in particular his chapter ‘Defining Creativity Historically’, an extract 
of which was subsequently presented to the UK Parliamentary Committee on 
Creative Partnerships.10 Pope’s chapter on the history of creativity almost 
exactly replicates the linear arguments of his sources, which, once again, are 
narrowly dependant on the etymology cited in the Oxford English Dictionary 
and Raymond Williams’ Keywords. Hence Williams argues that the history of 
creativity from the medieval to the modern era is one of increasing ‘emphasis 
on human activity’11 and Pope echoes that it was ‘gradually and fitfully’ that a 
‘human sense of agency’ crept into the meaning of the word ‘create’.12 
 
Although Pope characterises his history as ‘fitful’, there is actually little that is 
fitful or disruptive in his narrative, which is one in which ‘much more 
positive’13 links and ‘firm’14 associations are made down the centuries, and in 
which all roads and citations lead smoothly to a climax in the present. Also 
problematic is the way in which Pope’s argument presupposes a direct 
equivalence between the history of the word and the history of the idea ----- so 
much so, that his method appears to be one of extracting citations from the 
Oxford English Dictionary and matching them to printed sources. There is little 
if any elaboration of the cultural historical context of the citations he uses, or 
any attempt to question the methodology that underpins the OED’s 
selections. Ultimately, the problem inherent in Pope’s work is best summed 
                                                 
9
 Keith Negus and Nigel Pickering, Creativity, Communication and Cultural Value, 
Sage, 2004, p.2. 
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 Rob Pope, Creativity: History, Theory, Practice, Routledge, London, 2005. 
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 Williams, Keywords, p.83. 
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 Pope, p.38. 
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 Pope, p.38. 
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 Pope, p.39. 
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up in the chapter’s title ----- the way that Pope embarks on his project with the 
stated intention of ‘defining creativity’,15 posing an ideal signification in the 
present for which he then constructs an alleged origin in the past.  
 
The problem here is not simply one of historical teleology ----- including the 
way in which the recent flurry of creative industries narratives overlook 
developments in cultural historiography as it has been debated and practiced 
for the last thirty years (tending towards an old-fashioned presentation of 
narratives in which ideas are transmitted in unbroken lines from one ‘great 
man’ to the next, with little attempt to grapple with the problem of audience, 
or to look for their alleged origins in the world beyond the arts). But also 
because these proliferating narratives or ‘myths of origin’ have the effect of 
eliding alternate paradigms and ideas of process that could more 
productively inform the contemporary debate. 
 
The Reproductive Imagination 
Though critics point to wildly different dates for the origin of the discourse of 
creativity, Williams (and, following his lead, Negus, Pickering, and Pope) 
present the eighteenth century as a pivotal period in its formation. Despite 
this consensus, the evidence they present for the claim is slight.16 In particular, 
Williams points to the fact that in 1728 the minor Scottish poet David Mallet 
was the first to apply the modern concept of creativity to the powers of the 
poet.17 The source for the claim is a quotation from Mallet’s The Excursion, in 
particular Mallet’s opening line ‘Muse, Creative Power, IMAGINATION!’ 
However, it ought to be noted that Mallet makes use of the word creative in 
the context of invoking the poetic muse, a literary device that poets 
traditionally used to signal that they were working within a given tradition, 
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 Pope, p.35. 
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 A detailed analysis of the sources and origins cited for the discourse of creativity is 
given in a forthcoming article, Camilla Nelson, ‘The Invention of Creativity: the 
Emergence of a Discourse,’ Cultural Studies Review.  
17
 Williams, Keywords, p.73; Williams, The Long Revolution, p.9; Negus and 
Pickering, p.3; Dawson, p.27; and Pope, p.38. 
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composing their work according to fixed rules. There are in fact several earlier 
examples of the word ‘creative’ used in the context of the hymnic tradition (as 
Paul Dawson points out, the poet John Hopkins invokes his Muse’s gifts: 
‘You, like creative Heav’n your Labours frame;/You spoke the Word and at 
your Breath they came’),18 and this makes it difficult to determine whether 
Mallet intended ----- or that his readers understood ----- the word ‘creative’ to 
signify a human rather than divine or muse-like attribute.  
 
Moreover, the version of the poem quoted in all the above-mentioned works 
is taken from the radically revised 1743 edition of The Excursion, and not the 
original 1728 edition (as cited), which actually read: 
 
FANCY, creative Power, at whose Command  
Arise unnumber'd Images of Things,  
Thy hourly Offspring; Thou whose mighty Will  
Peoples with airy Shapes the Pathless Vale 
Where pensive Meditation loves to stray 
Fancy, with me range Earth’s extended Space 
Surveying Nature’s Works.19 
 
The 1728 work falls more naturally within the tradition of the invocation, with 
the poet asking his muse ‘Fancy’ to be his companion on a journey. In the 
more commonly cited 1743 version, the balance shifts and imagination 
becomes a more impressive player in the poem. Thus, 
 
Companion of the muse, creative power,  
IMAGINATION! at whose great command,  
Arise unnumber'd images of things,  
Thy hourly offspring: thou, who canst at will 
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 Quoted in Dawson, p.27.  
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 David Mallet, Mallet, D. ([1728] 2007) The Excursion, J. Walthoe, 1728, pp. 5-6, 
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People with air-born shapes the silent wood, 
And solitary veil, thy own domain, 
Where Contemplation haunts; O come invok’d, 
To waft me on thy many-tinctur’d wing 
O’er EARTH’s extended space:20 
 
The changes would seem to suggest that Mallet welcomed a more radical 
interpretation of his work, given the emphasis he gives to the word 
‘IMAGINATION,’ for example. However, Mallet’s description of the poem as 
it is laid out in the poem’s ‘Argument’ continues to make it clear that the 
invocation is ‘addressed to Fancy’ ----- that it is Fancy and not the poet who is 
creative, using her heavenly power to waft the poet on her ‘many-tinctur’d 
wing’.  
 
Other than Mallet’s use of the adjective ‘creative’ there seems little in The 
Excursion to differentiate it from the work of his contemporaries, and less to 
suggest that the use of the adjective signals a new epistemic relationship to 
imagination. Indeed The Excursion belongs, together with James Thomson’s 
better known To the Memory of Sir Issac Newton, to a sizable genre of 
eighteenth century poetry devoted to Newton’s Principia and Opticks, which, 
in the words of literary critic M.H. Abrams, it ‘joyously pillag[es]’.21 Far from 
being innovative, M.H. Abrams characterizes the genre as the product of an 
illustrative process, via which the ‘truth’ of Newton’s Opticks is turned into 
poetry through a process of ornamentation ----- an illustrating of its statements 
----- rather than creating things afresh. In other respects, The Excursion retains 
the Classical period’s concern with the external world (as opposed to, for 
example, the idea of creative self expression). It is heavily influenced by the 
Gothic and Picturesque (elements that are also far more marked in the 1743 
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 David Mallet, ‘The Excursion’, in Samuel Johnson (ed), The Works of the English 
Poets, from Chaucer to Cowper, J. Johnson, London, [1743] 1810, p.17, Google 
Books, <http://books.google.com.au> 
21
 Meyer Howard Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the 
Critical Tradition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1971, p.304. 
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edition), but these elements are strongly framed in the context of an ordered 
Classical universe, in which the rainbow, for example, is deemed more poetic 
for having been demystified by Newton’s ‘pure intelligence’ and ‘mind’s clear 
vision’ into a vision of ‘ideal harmony’.22 In short, an equally tenable 
interpretation of the poem would place it as yet another example of 
imagination enlisted in the service of reason. 
 
Joseph Addison is another eighteenth century writer whose work is 
commonly invoked to support claims about the flourishing of the discourse of 
creativity in that period, and his use of the divine analogy ‘Imagination ... has 
in it something like creation’ is enlisted in the arguments of Pope, Engell and 
Dawson among others.23 However, in ‘The Pleasures of the Imagination’, the 
essay from which this citation is taken, Addison goes on to suggest that the 
faculty of imagination is actually less refined than the faculty of reason. He 
argues that reason searches for hidden causes, while imagination is content to 
passively experience things. For Addison, this is why the pleasures of 
imagination are more easily acquired than those of reason. He writes: 
 
A beautiful Prospect delights the Soul, as much as a 
Demonstration; and a Description in Homer has 
charmed more Readers than a Chapter in Aristotle. 
Besides, the Pleasures of the Imagination have this 
Advantage, above those of the Understanding, that they 
are more obvious, and more easie to be acquired. It is 
but opening the Eye, and the Scene enters. The Colours 
paint themselves on the Fancy, with very little Attention 
of Thought or Application of the Mind in the Beholder. 
We are struck, we know not how, with the Symmetry of 
any thing we see, and immediately assent to the Beauty 
of an Object, without enquiring into the particular 
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 Mallet, The Excursion, in The Works of the English Poets, p.61. 
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 Pope, p.38; Engell, p.36-38; and Dawson, p.27. 
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Causes and Occasions of it.24 
 
According to Addison, seeing a landscape or reading about one affects us 
equally ----- both require remarkably little effort; just an ‘opening [of] the Eye’. 
Though Addison’s essay is justifiably famous for the way in which it collects 
the imaginative arts together (a new concept for the eighteenth century), the 
imagination it describes remains profoundly passive. Thus, the ‘scene enters’, 
‘colors paint’, we are ‘struck … with the Symmetry’ and ‘immediately assent’. 
Collectively Addison’s essays on the imagination work to suggest that the 
imagination is not serious, rather it ‘bestows charms’, offers ‘a kind of 
refreshment’ or ‘ornament’ to the more important work of reason.25 
 
In attempting to create a narrative that reaches as far back into history as 
possible, the studies of creativity examined in this essay often miss the 
fundamental fracture in the discourse of the mind that occurs at the end of the 
eighteenth century ----- what M.H. Abrams once called the ‘Copernican 
revolution in epistemology’ that was the Romantic era.26 As Foucault has 
argued, the shift between the classical episteme and the modern is one in 
which the structure of knowledge undergoes a fundamental reversal. In the 
course of this reversal, imagination, once regarded as a poor cousin to reason 
----- at best, passive, and at worst, a dangerous faculty that led to madness or 
delusion ----- becomes the primary faculty of the human mind. To overlook 
this shift is to miss the tension between the Enlightenment ideal of the 
rationally bounded individual and the Romantic myth of the unbounded 
autonomy of the infinite self. It is also to elide the possibility that the 
arrangement of knowledge that gave rise to creativity may well have been 
that which created the modern and anthropological subject ----- a new 
arrangement of knowledge that created man as the central subject and object 
of reality.  
                                                 
24
 Joseph Addison, ‘The Pleasures of Imagination,’ Spectator No. 411, 1712, Project 
Gutenberg <www.gutenberg.org/etext/12030> 
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The Creative Mind 
 
Kant is an obvious figure in this transition. It was Kant who increased the 
scope of the imagination in the theory of knowledge to a revolutionary 
degree. Just as Copernicus reversed the way people thought about the 
relationship of the earth to the sun, Kant reversed the way people thought 
about the relationship between the mind and the world of objects and 
experience. In a dramatic reversal of both empiricism and rationality he 
argued that some of the properties observed in objects might be due to the 
nature and constitution of the human spectator. Or, as Kant indelibly put it: 
 
Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the 
movements of the heavenly bodies on the 
supposition that they all revolved around the 
spectator, [Copernicus] tried whether he might not 
have better success if he made the spectator to 
revolve and the stars to remain at rest.27 
 
Kant accepts that knowledge begins with sense experience, but argues that 
the mind applies preexisting categories of perception ----- including logic, 
causality, substance, space and time ----- to the object. In this sense, the 
perceiving mind might be said to discover only that which it itself has partly 
made. With Kant, imagination ceases to be an empty storehouse for images 
generated by the senses, a blank sheet of paper on which the imprint of 
experience is placed, and begins to be understood as active and productive. 
Interestingly enough, it is not long after Kant, that scientists and 
phrenologists such as F.J. Gall, Charles Bell and Erasmus Darwin begin to 
elucidate the active mind in neurological terms ----- for the first time locating 
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the mind in the brain, and not in the heart, the spinal column, the pineal 
gland, or the body as a whole.28  
 
In English, Kant’s influence manifested itself in poetry before entering into 
philosophy. In particular, in the work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
imagination is seen to take the leap beyond the subject through the act of 
artistic creation. With Coleridge, the imagination ceases to be ‘a lazy Looker-
on on an external world’ and is endowed with a synthetic or ‘magical’ 
power.29 He describes this new apprehension of imagination as a power of 
knowledge that is a repetition in the subject’s mind of the auto-poetic power 
of God’s creation. Or, in Coleridge’s own words, the imagination is ‘the living 
Power and prime Agent of all human Perception’ and ‘a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’.30 This statement 
of the artist’s auto-poetic power is qualitatively different from, and therefore 
historically discontinuous with, the tradition of the divine analogy ----- that is, 
the many statements likening the poet to a ‘second Maker’ that form the 
subject matter of so many histories of creativity, such as, for example, the 
quotation from Tasso that Williams argues is the ‘decisive source of the 
modern meaning’ of the term,31 and that the literary historian E.N. Tigerstedt 
has extended back to the Florentine poet Christoforo Landino in the fifteenth 
century.32 The essential difference is that for Coleridge the perceiving mind is 
seen to be active in giving shape and meaning to what is outside it, so that our 
knowledge of what is outside us is also the knowledge of ourselves. Hence, 
Coleridge calls this new creative power both a self-manifestation and self-
discovery because we see ourselves through the structure of our own minds.  
                                                 
28
 The idea that the brain is the location of mental activity is actually very modern. 
Aristotle, for example, believed that the brain was the organ that supplied heat to the 
body. 
29
 Quoted in John Shawcross, ‘Introduction’, Biographia Literaria, The Clarendon 
Press, [1817] 1907, p.xxxi, Google Books, <http://books.google.com.au> 
30
 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, The Clarendon Press, [1817] 1907, 
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 Williams, Keywords, p.72. 
32
 E.N. Tigerstedt, ‘The Poet as Creator: Origins of a Metaphor,’ Comparative 
Literature Studies, 5, 1968, pp. 455-488. 
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Coleridge is an alluring progenitor for the concept of creativity. However, 
there are many intractable problems in his styling of the concept, which 
Williams’ ignores. The most obvious, perhaps, is the way in which Coleridge 
constructs the problem as primarily theological, and the strange distortions, 
digressions, convolutions and confusions in his work are more easily 
understood as the result of his attempt to make both science and philosophy 
compatible with traditional Christian doctrine. Coleridge, in company with 
radical scientists of his time, felt compelled to understand the world not as 
mechanism but as dynamic flux. However, much of his philosophical work 
----- such as, for example, the posthumously published, though little read, 
Theory of Life ----- is an attack on scientists such as William Lawrence or 
Erasmus Darwin who attempted to understand the world as a kind of 
spontaneous or self-sufficient growth. In fact, what is original in Coleridge’s 
reworking of the works of the German idealists and naturphilosophen from 
whom he borrowed, is precisely the way he takes their ‘dangerously’ 
pantheistic ideas and presses them into the service of Trinitarian Christian 
dogma.  
 
W.A. Ward, the late Victorian academic who is credited with originating the 
noun ‘creativity’ by the editors of the Oxford English Dictionary has very little 
to say that is positive about Coleridge’s philosophical work. In an essay by 
C.E. Vaughn, commissioned by Ward in his capacity as editor of the 
Cambridge History of English Literature, Coleridge is portrayed as ‘the fiery foe 
of the rights of man’, as an advocate of an aristocratic style of government 
‘imposing itself upon the rest of the community from above’. He is accused of 
obscuring rather than illuminating Kant, of twisting ‘truth into the service of a 
particular religious creed’. Vaughn concludes, ‘The result is that, at the 
present day, his theory seems ludicrously out of date.’ 33 
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 C.E. Vaughn, ‘Coleridge’ in W.A. Ward ed., Cambridge History of English 
Literature, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.139. 
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That is not to say that Coleridge has not been influential in the contemporary 
construction of creativity. Rather, it is to argue that the version of Coleridge 
that has been so influential ----- that Williams argues comes so ‘very close to’ 
the concept of creativity in its modern sense ----- is the secularized, modernized 
version that is largely the product of departments of English literature from 
the late 1950s onwards. 
 
Nevertheless, it is in the period following Kant and the Romantics that 
creative imagination comes to be seen as the ‘true source of genius’ and the 
‘basis of originality’, words which themselves gain a new meaning. Genius is 
distinguished from mere talent, and redefined as a quality of mind that makes 
rules instead of following them, and the art object comes to be understood as 
the embodiment of original aesthetic ideals that are the product of the artist’s 
creative imagination, not mere reflections, imitations, or perfections of truths 
found elsewhere. The emergent discourse also needs to be understood as a 
product of the new system of the arts arising in the eighteenth century, with 
its now familiar dualities of art/craft, aesthetic/purpose, genius/talent, 
creative/mechanical, which can be usefully mapped through the shifting 
definitions provided in the French Encyclopédie between 1751 and 1780.34 The 
consequence of this reorganisation is that art is effectively created as a 
separate realm of human endeavour standing above and outside the rest of 
social and economic life. For this reason, Marx argued that ‘The exclusive 
concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals, and its suppression in 
the broad mass which is bound up with this, is a consequence of the division 
of labour’, attributing an economic origin to the process through which the 
older idea of art as construction is replaced by a system that devalues the 
work of the artisan as a manual worker, and revalues the work of the artist 
via a cult of mystification.35 Also relevant is the way in which the new 
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 For an excellent account of this development see Paul Oskar Kristeller, ‘The 
Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics Part II,’ Journal of 
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discourse intersects with the artist’s bid for respectability, driven by the 
artist’s new reliance on the vagaries of the market as traditional patronage 
systems collapse. There is an emerging sense in which artists ‘add value’ to 
their work by placing art beyond value. 
 
The new discourse affects both the creation of art and its reception. Creative 
art is arranged in the contemplative spaces of the recently invented art 
museum, a centre that also becomes a storehouse for imperial plunder. In the 
same way, the cannon of English literature appears on the university 
curriculum for the very first time (for example, Oxford University did not 
introduce English Literature as a subject until 1875), just as music moves out 
of church and salon into the rarified spaces of the concert hall. The new 
discourse is also edged with a strange nationalistic fervor, and it is not 
coincidental that the OED’s earliest citation of the noun ‘creativity’ occurs in 
the context of a chapter on Shakespeare as the English national poet written 
by the German-educated historian W.A. Ward, with my own research 
locating earlier citations in historical works influenced by the prevailing 
nationalist/racialist interpretation of Herder. It is from this dense cultural 
matrix that the concept of creativity actually emerges. It a strange and 
remarkable birth ----- one that eclipses a two thousand year old tradition of art 
practice ----- and occurs in an age that prided itself on its scientific spirit, but 
saw fit to endow the practice of writing on paper or painting on canvas with 
mystical attributes. 
 
Hence, ‘Reason is to imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to 
the spirit, as the shadow to the substance,’ wrote Shelley in a sentence that 
reverses many centuries of European thought.36 For Wordsworth, the mind is 
‘creator and receiver both’ and human imagination ‘Is but another name for 
absolute power/And clearest insight, amplitude of mind,/And reason in her 
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most exalted mood’.37 John Ruskin addressed himself to objects that bore the 
impress of ‘highest creative life that is to say the mind of man’38 William 
Hazlitt located ‘this creative impulse, this plastic power’ in works of art from 
Chaucer to Shakespeare.39 Thomas Carlyle extended the term to other 
professions, finding an ‘active power’, ‘creative instinct’ or dynamic force in 
all kinds of human production,40 and popular newspapers of the period were 
as likely to invoke the ‘creative power’ of industry, as they were to invoke the 
creative powers of the poet. It is also during this period that statements of a 
qualitatively different order seem to be found, including Benjamin Disraeli’s 
assertion that ‘man is made to create,’41 Marx’s argument that human 
happiness lies in a ‘positive, creative activity,’42 Matthew Arnold’s claim that 
‘a free creative activity is the true function of man,’43 and Frederic Nietzsche’s 
argument that it is ‘creative plenipotence’ that separates the Ubermensch from 
the rest of humanity.44 The work of such writers exemplify the shift away 
from the eighteenth century idea of a fixed and immutable universe (as 
exemplified in the mathematical physics of Newton), towards a universe that 
is understood as a continuous process of organic invention ----- a universe 
unfolding within a metaphysical structure that is malleable enough to impart 
a new sense of freedom to human endeavour. The concept of creativity can be 
understood as a product of the flux and upheaval of the industrial revolution 
----- the period of the mid-nineteenth century when the term ‘creative power’ 
entered into popular usage. This paradigmatic shift gains its most 
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characteristic expression in Darwin’s theory of evolution ----- and, no less 
famously, in The Descent of Man, the work in which Darwin aligns human 
imagination with a narrative of continuous novelty or invention, formation 
and transformation, arguing, ‘The imagination is one of the highest 
prerogatives of man. By this faculty he unites, independently of the will, 
former images and ideas, and thus creates brilliant and novel results’.45 In this 
sense, it might even be possible that the discourse of creativity does not 
originate in art, or the discourse of imagination, as is commonly believed, but 
represents new forms of thought migrating into the arts from philosophy, 
political economy, or what is more likely, from the emerging biological and 
life sciences.46 These new forms of though can be seen to reach full expression 
in twentieth century works such as those of the philosopher-mathematician 
Alfred North Whitehead, who defined creativity as the process, ‘whereby the 
actual world has its character of temporal passage to novelty’.47 Or, more 
forcefully, ‘The creativity of the world is the throbbing emotion of the past 
hurling itself into a new transcendent fact.’48 
 
Despite its emphasis on the new, what seems crucial to the functioning of the 
discourse as it flourishes is that ‘creativity’ appear old, that it offer us a 
mythical history stretching back to the first time man applied paint to a cave 
wall. This illusion is aided by the emergence of a new critical vocabulary with 
which to survey the entire history of European art, together with means and 
opportunity, as art and literature programs flourish in the university cloister. 
In reality, the discourse of creativity is not even two hundred years old. It is 
more likely less ----- for it is only once creativity is reified and named that it 
makes itself available as an object for scientific study. Once named, it can be 
measured and dissected by psychologists and brain surgeons, and political 
                                                 
45
 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, Penguin, London, [1871] 2004, p.95. 
46
 My own preliminary research has also located a sizable discourse emerging in the 
fields of technology and commerce, which requires further investigation. 
47
 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making, Fordham University Press, New 
York, [1926] 1996, p.174. 
48
 Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, Free Press, New York, [1933] 1967, 
p.227. 
18 
 
and educational institutions can create policies for its cultivation. In this 
sense, the important period for the formation of the discourse might even be 
the twentieth century ----- the period in which the discourse becomes codified.  
 
In this respect, my own preliminary research indicates that the abstract noun 
creativity entered into common usage in the US between 1926 and 1953, 
where it far outstripped its then minimal usage in the United Kingdom. The 
growing popularity of the term was accompanied by a dramatic shift in the 
contents of the discourse, so that creativity ceases to be understood as the 
preserve of genius, but is located in all kinds of people and human 
endeavours. The American ideal is exemplified in the work of the advertising 
impresario Alex Osborn and his wildly successful bestseller, Applied 
Imagination ----- a work that is inflected with a particular American character, 
combining ideas of ‘uplift’ with ideas of accessibility and the concept of the 
‘common man’. In this sense, Osborne’s work draws implicitly and explicitly 
on the ideas of the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey, whose work 
influenced the cultural activities of the Federal Arts Program under 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, the Progressive Education Movement (of which the 
creative writing movement is an enduring legacy), and the work of others 
including the psycho-educationalist Hughes Mearns at the Chicago 
Laboratory School. The significance of Osborn is that he radically transfigures 
these ideas in order to make them compatible with a specifically nationalist 
enunciation of entrepreneurial capital. 
 
The decades of the 1950s and 1960s saw an unprecedented proliferation of 
institutes and foundations devoted to the fostering of creativity in the US, a 
phenomena that J.P. Guilford, dubbed the ‘father’ of creativity studies in 
psychology, allegedly attributed to the massive redirection of funds from the 
US defence budget in the wake of the ‘Sputnik Shock’ ----- the US, it was 
feared, was losing the Space Race because its scientists were not ‘creative’ 
enough. Shortly afterwards, Paul Torrance invented the Torrance Test (the 
‘creative’ equivalent of the IQ test) to measure creativity in American 
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children, an estimated one trillion dollars flooded into tertiary education 
institutions through the National Defense Education Act, Osborn’s Creative 
Education Foundation received contracts from the US Air Force, and 
Guilford’s research at the University of Southern California was funded by 
the US Navy. These government-sponsored initiatives shifted the focus of the 
discourse once again ----- this time onto the identification and study of 
individuals and individual traits as a means to combat Soviet totalitarianism, 
but mobilizing those traits within a framework that placed emphasis on 
organizational and structural optimization, which is the most likely 
antecedent of creativity theories in organization and business studies today. 
Significantly, it is also in the decade of the 1950s that the Anglo-American 
word ‘creativity’ is imported into European languages, such as French and 
German.49 
 
It would be foolish to argue that creativity is a purely cultural fabrication, but 
it would be equally foolish to allege a purely biological origin. There is a need 
for caution when it comes to touting the successive discoveries of 
neuroscientists scouting for the creative gene, or attempting to make use of 
those discoveries by cultivating certain attributes within the classroom. There 
is also a pressing need to examine the ideological content of the discourse ----- 
particularly in these days of Creative Industries, Creative Economies and 
Creative Nations. Given the genealogy of the term, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that creativity should become such a prominent feature of contemporary 
managerial discourse, for example ----- that creativity should be so constantly 
touted as the thing to fix the economy, prop up the nation, and in one of the 
most discomforting uses of the term I have so far encountered, that the 9/11 
Commission Report should argue that it is ‘crucial to find a way of 
routinizing, even bureaucractizing, the exercise of imagination’ and the US 
House Select Committee on Intelligence should call hearings to discuss the 
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Commission’s ‘requirement for imagination and creativity’ in the US 
intelligence service.50 
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